Abstract. Justification logics are propositional modal-like logics that instead of statements A is known include statements of the form A is known for reason t where the term t can represent an informal justification for A or a formal proof of A. In our present work, we introduce model-theoretic tools, namely: filtrations and a certain form of generated submodels, in the context of justification logic in order to obtain decidability results. Apart from reproving already known results in a uniform way, we also prove new results. In particular, we use our submodel construction to establish decidability for a justification logic with common knowledge for which so far no decidability proof was available.
Introduction
Justification logics are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for the agents' knowledge [3, 4] . The first logic of this kind, the Logic of Proofs LP, was developed by Artemov to provide the modal logic S4 with provability semantics [1, 2] . The language of justification logics has also been used to create a new approach to the logical omniscience problem [5] , to study self-referential proofs [14] , and to explore the evidential dynamics of public announcements [8, 10] .
Instead of statements A is known, denoted A, justification logics reason about justifications for knowledge by using the construct t : A to formalize statements t is a justification for A, where, dependent on the application, the evidence term t can be viewed as an informal justification or a formal mathematical proof. For an example see Fig. 1 where the axioms of the justification logic LP are listed alongside the axioms of S4 to point out the correspondence of the operations on evidence terms to standard modal axioms. This correspondence (as well as many other such correspondences between certain modal logics and justification logics) can be shown in a formal way. While it is easy to see, that replacing all justification terms by in a theorem of LP yields a theorem of S4, the other direction is much more involved and known as the realization theorem. See [7] for a uniform proof and survey of realization theorems for all logics in the modal cube.
Fitting [11] introduced epistemic semantics for justification logics. The socalled Fitting models are Kripke models (W, R, ν) augmented by an evidence relation E that states which terms are admissible evidence for which formulae.
Filtrations are a tool in modal logic for obtaining from a given, usually infinite, model a smaller, usually finite, model by factoring the set of worlds with respect to a certain equivalence relation. As noted in [6] , filtrations were first introduced in [19] and given their name in [15] . Given the close relationship between Fitting models and Kripke models, it is a natural task to adopt filtrations for justification logics. The crucial step is of course to take into account the evidence relation when identifying states.
Filtrations are often used to prove a finite model property and thereby establish decidability of a given modal logic, see e.g. [6] . Decidability for the justification logics presented here was originally shown in [12, 13, 16] . We adapt the filtration technique from modal logic to obtain an alternative uniform proof of decidability for these justification logics. We then apply the newly developed technique to establish the decidability of the multi-agent justification logic with common knowledge presented in [9] .
In Section 2, we introduce the syntax and semantics of the justification logics we are using. In Section 3, we define filtrations for justification logics and prove their basic properties. We treat two specific examples of filtrations in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6, we use these two examples to prove the decidability of the defined justification logics. This also leads us to investigate general properties necessary for the decidability of justification logics and enables us to prove the decidability of a multi-agent justification logic with common knowledge in Section 7.
Justification Logics
Justification terms are built from constants c i and variables x i according to the following grammar:
We denote the set of terms by Tm. Formulae are built from atomic propositions p i according to the following grammar:
Prop denotes the set of atomic propositions and Fm denotes the set of formulae.
The set Sub(F ) of subformulae of a given formula F is defined inductively as follows
The axioms of J CS consist of all instances of the following schemes:
A1 finitely many schemes axiomatizing classical propositional logic
We will consider extension of J CS by the following axioms schemes.
A | c is a constant and A is an axiom of L}.
A constant specification CS for a logic L is called 1. axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom A of L CS there is a constant c such that c : A ∈ CS 2. schematic if for each constant c the set {A | c : A ∈ CS} consists of one or several (possibly zero) axiom schemes, i.e., every constant justifies certain axiom schemes.
For a constant specification CS the deductive system J CS is the Hilbert system given by the axioms A1-A3 and by the rules modus ponens and axiom necessitation:
where n ≥ 0. In the presence of the j4 axiom a simplified axiom necessitation rule can be used: Definition 1 (Evidence relation). Let (W, R) be a Kripke frame, i.e., W = ∅ and R ⊆ W × W , and CS be a constant specification. An admissible evidence relation E for a logic L CS is a subset of Tm × Fm × W that satisfies the closure conditions:
Depending on whether or not the logic L CS contains the j4 axiom, the evidence function has to satisfy one of the following two sets of closure conditions. If L CS does not include the j4 axiom, then the additional requirement is:
If L CS includes the j4 axiom, then the additional requirement is: 4. if c : A ∈ CS and w ∈ W , then (c, A, w) ∈ E 5. if (t, A, w) ∈ E, then (!t, t : A, w) ∈ E 6. if (t, A, w) ∈ E and wRv, then (t, A, v) ∈ E If we drop condition 6, then we say E is a t-evidence relation. Sometimes we use E(s, A, w) for (s, A, w) ∈ E. Definition 2 (Evidence bases).
1. An evidence base B is a subset of Tm × Fm × W . 2. An evidence relation E is based on B, if B ⊆ E.
The closure conditions in the definition of admissible evidence function give rise to a monotone operator. The minimal evidence relation based on B is the least fixed point of that operator and thus always exists.
• if L CS includes the j4 axiom, then R is transitive;
• if L CS includes the jt axiom, then R is reflexive;
• if L CS includes the jd axiom, then R is serial. -E is an admissible evidence relation for L CS over the frame (W, R), -ν : Prop → P(W ), called a valuation function. We say a formula A is valid in a model M = (W, R, E, ν) if for all w ∈ W we have M, w A. We say a formula A is valid for a logic L CS if for all models M for L CS we have that A is valid in M.
The logics defined above are sound and complete (with a restriction in case of the logics containing the jd axiom). See [3, 11, 17] for the full proofs of the following results.
Soundness can be obtained by an easy induction on the derivation of the formula.
Theorem 5 (Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification. If a formula
For completeness a canonical model construction is used. The axiomatical appropriateness of the constant specification in case the logic contains the jd axiom is necessary to show the seriality condition on the accessibility relation.
Theorem 6 (Completeness).
Let CS be a constant specification. If a formula
A is not derivable in L CS ∈ {J CS , JT CS , J4 CS , LP CS }, then there exists a model M for L CS with M, w A for some world w in M.
Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. If a formula
A is not derivable in L CS ∈ {JD CS , JD4 CS }, then there exists a model M for L CS with M, w A for some world w in M.
Filtrations
Given the close relationship of models for justification logics to Kripke models, it is not surprising that the two definitions of filtrations look very similar. The major difference is that we have to take the evidence relation into consideration. In modal logic we identify worlds that behave the same way, whereas in justification logic we identify worlds that behave the same way for the same reason.
Definition 7 (Filtration). Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model and Φ some set of formulae that is closed under subformulae. We define an equivalence relation 
E(t, B, w) if and only if E(t, B, v).
We denote the equivalence classes of Φ by [w] Φ . When Φ is clear from the context, we will often only write
is called a filtration of M through Φ if it satisfies the following:
There are two major changes of the definition compared to the case for modal logic. The first change concerns the definition of the equivalence relation to identify worlds. Whereas a modal formula B can only fail due to the existence of an accessible world not satisfying B, a justification formula t : B might fail in two ways: either B is not satisfied in an accessible world or t is not admissible evidence for B at the current world. So we have to refine our equivalence relation to only identify worlds that do not only satisfy the same formulae but also behave the same with respect to the evidence relation. The second change concerns the evidence relation of the filtration: it has to satisfy conditions similar to the Minand Max-conditions (R1) and (R2) for the accessibility relation.
The crucial property of a filtration of a model through Φ is that the behavior of the model and the filtration is the same with respect to formulae in Φ:
Lemma 8. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model, Φ a set of formulae closed under subformulae, and
Then for all worlds w ∈ W and formulae A ∈ Φ we have
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of A. The case for propositional variables is immediate by the definition of ν Φ and the cases for the propositional connectives are immediate by the induction hypothesis. Let us now consider the case A = t : B.
First we show the direction from right to left. Assume M, w t :
For the other direction suppose
and by (1) and the induction hypothesis we get M, v B. Furthermore, from (2) and (E2) we get E(t, B, w) and we conclude M, w t : B.
A filtration inherits some conditions on the accessibility relations. Furthermore, a filtration through a finite set has finitely many worlds.
Lemma 9. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model, Φ a set of formulae closed under subformulae, and
Proof. The first two claims follow immediately from (R1). The last claim follows from the fact that each element [w] Φ ∈ W Φ can be characterized by the set of formulae A ∈ Φ that hold in [w] Φ as well as the set of formulae t : B ∈ Φ with E Φ (t, B, [w] Φ ) and the fact that P(Φ) × P(Φ) has only finitely many elements.
Non-transitive Case
As a first example we will define filtrations for logics not containing the j4 axiom. E(t, B, v) .
Proof. We have to check the following conditions. 
We proceed by induction on the construction of
, then by definition of B nt Φ we have that t : B ∈ Φ and E(t, B, w ) for some w ∈ [w]. By w = Φ w we conclude E(t, B, w ).
[w]) (for some i ∈ {1, 2}), then by induction hypothesis we get that E(t i , B, w ) and thus also E(t 1 + t 2 , B, w ) by the closure conditions on E. A, [w] ), then by induction hypothesis E(t 1 , A → B, w ) and E(t 2 , A, w ). So, by the closure conditions, we get E(t 1 · t 2 , B, w ).
-The case for axiom necessitation is trivial, as we have
for any world v ∈ W .
Transitive Case
The case for logics containing the j4 axiom is a bit more involved, as now the accessibility relation of the filtration has to be transitive, which is not guaranteed by the definition of filtration. 
As a first step we have to show that E tr Φ as defined is not only a t-evidence relation but an actual evidence relation. 
Decidability
The theorems in this section originate from [13] . We thus only give proof sketches for the sake of brevity.
Definition 16 (Finitary model).
there exists a finite base B such that E is the minimal evidence relation based on B, and 3. the set {(w, p) ∈ W × Prop | w ∈ ν(p)} is finite. Proof. The claim follows trivially from Lemma 17 by renaming worlds to natural numbers.
The following theorem is a simple instance of Post's theorem [18] : A set is decidable if and only if both the set and its complement are recursively enumerable.
Theorem 19.
A logic is decidable if it is recursively enumerable and is sound and complete with respect to a set C such that 1. C is a recursively enumerable set of finite models and 2. the relation M, w A between models M ∈ C, worlds w in M, and formulae A is decidable.
Proof. We give a proof sketch, for full details cf. [13, Theorem 4.3.3] Given a formula A, we can simultaneously enumerate theorems B 0 , B 1 , . . . of the logic and potential counter-models M 0 , M 1 , . . . ∈ C and at each step check whether (a) A = B i or (b) M i , w A for some w ∈ M i . Eventually either (a) or (b) will hold for some i, thus indicating whether the logic proves A.
The set of finitary models for L CS with the domain being a finite subset of N is recursively enumerable.
Proof. We give a proof sketch, for full details cf. [13, Lemma 4.4.6] .
It is obvious that the set of such models for J CS can be recursively enumerated. Models of each of the other five logics must additionally satisfy certain conditions on the accessibility relation, some combination of transitivity, reflexivity, and seriality. Since each of these conditions can be effectively verified, the models of J CS that are unsuitable for a given logic can be effectively removed from the enumeration of models for L CS .
Lemma 21. Let CS be a decidable schematic constant specification and L CS ∈ {J CS , JD CS , JD4 CS , JT CS , J4 CS , LP CS }. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a finitary model for L CS . Then the relation M, w A between worlds w ∈ W and formulae A is decidable.
Proof. We give a proof sketch, for full details cf. [13, Corollary 4.4.8] .
We can show this by induction on the formula A, the cases for propositions and Boolean connectives being trivial.
The crucial step is to show that the relation E(t, B, w) between terms t ∈ Tm, formulae B ∈ Fm and worlds w ∈ W is decidable (see [13, Lemma 4.4.7] ).
Let B be the base for the minimal evidence relation E of M. Given a fixed term t, we will construct a sequence of sets E In order to keep the sets finite and as we are given a schematic constant specification, we will use variables X, Y, . . . ranging over schemes of formulae and variables P, Q, . . . ranging over formulae. Also, we assume that our constant specification is given in terms of schemes, i.e. CS = {c : X | c is a constant and X is a scheme}.
The sets are defined as follows s, B, w) and s ∈ Sub(t)} ∪ {(c, X) | c : X ∈ CS and c ∈ Sub(t)} Assume E n t (w) has been constructed, in order to obtain E n+1 t (w) add the following
n t (w) and (s 2 , X 2 ) ∈ E n t (w) such that the most general unifier σ of X 1 and X 2 exists and s 1 · s 2 ∈ Sub(t) -(s 1 · s 2 , Q) for any (s 1 , P ) ∈ E n t (w) and (s 2 , X 2 ) ∈ E n t (w) where Q is a fresh variable over formulas and s 1 · s 2 ∈ Sub(t) -(s 1 + s 2 , X) for any (s 1 , X) or (s 2 , X) ∈ E n t (w) with s 1 + s 2 ∈ Sub(t) -depending on whether the logic L CS contains the j4 axiom, we distinguish the following two cases: If the logic does not contain the j4 axiom, we add
If the logic contains the j4 axiom, we add
• (!s, s : X) for any (s, X) ∈ E n t (w) with !s ∈ Sub(t) • (s, X) for any (s, X) ∈ E n t (v) with R(v, w) and s ∈ Sub(t) All the sets E i t (w) are finite. As W and Sub(t) are finite, there is an n easily computable from the size of W and the length of t such that E n t (w) = E i t (w) for all i ≥ n. Furthermore, we have E(t, B, w) if and only if B unifies with some X such that (t, X) ∈ E n t (w). Thus, the relation E(t, B, w) is decidable.
Corollary 22 (Decidability). 
Any justification logic in

The Case of Common Knowledge
While the finiteness of the sets of worlds is a key feature of filtrations, the finite bases of our examples are due to the specific setup of the models and are by no means a necessary property of filtrations. On the other hand, if we start with a logic L CS which we already know to be sound and complete with respect to a class of finite models, we can adapt the construction we used to finitely base the evidence function for the filtrations.
Definition 23. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model and Φ some set of formulae that is closed under subformulae. The Φ-generated submodel M Φ of M is defined as (W, R, E Φ, ν Φ) where
1. E Φ is the minimal evidence relation based on B Φ where B Φ (t, B, w) if and only if t : B ∈ Φ and E(t, B, w)
2. ν Φ is given by
Like in the case for filtrations we get the following lemma.
Lemma 24. Let M = (W, R, E, ν) be a model, Φ a set of formulae closed under subformulae, and M Φ the Φ-generated submodel of M. Then for all worlds w in M and formulae A ∈ Φ we have M Φ, w A if and only if M, w A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on A. The case for atomic propositions is immediate by the definition of ν Φ and the cases for boolean connectives follow immediately by induction hypothesis. Let us consider the case when A is t : B. So assume M Φ, w t : B. We get (t, B, w) ∈ E Φ and M Φ, v B for all v ∈ W with R(w, v). The latter gives us M, v B by induction hypothesis whereas from the former we get (t, B, w) ∈ E as both E and E Φ are based on B Φ and E Φ is minimal with that property and hence E Φ ⊆ E. So we have M, w t : B.
For the other direction assume M, w t : B. We have thus E(t, B, w) and M, v B for all v ∈ W with R(w, v). Again, the latter gives us M Φ, v B by induction hypothesis and by the definition of E Φ we immediately get (t, B, w) ∈ E Φ from the former and thus M Φ, w t : B.
We can use this technique (adapted to the multi-agent case) to establish decidability for the justification logic with common knowledge LP C h that was introduced in [9] .
The logic LP C h is a multi-agent version of LP CS with additional axioms and operations on terms to deal with mutual and common knowledge. There are separate sets of terms for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , h} as well as for mutual knowledge E and for common knowledge C. The different kinds of knowledge suggest a slight change of notation. We will write [t] B to mean "t is a justification term of type for B", where ∈ {1, . . . , h, E, C}. Furthermore * will always denote an element of {1, . . . , h, C}.
The logic LP C h (CS) is given by the following axioms as well as the rules for modus ponens and axiom necessitation (for a given constant specification CS):
1. finitely many schemes axiomatizing classical propositional logic
The semantics for LP C h is given by models
where R i are reflexive, transitive accessibility relations on W and E are evidence relations satisfying closure conditions modeled on the axioms of LP C h analogous to the logics presented in Section 2.
1 Furthermore we define R E := h i=1 R i and R C as the transitive closure of R E . A formula being satisfied at a given world is then defined as before with the following crucial case for the formula being of the form [t] B 1) E (t, B, w) holds and 2) M, v B for all v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ R . Using a canonical model construction we can show the soundness and completeness of LP C h with respect to this class of models and as an immediate corollary of this construction (see [9, Theorem 20] ) we obtain Theorem 25. LP C h (CS) is sound and complete with respect to the class of singleton models for LP C h (CS). We can easily adapt the Φ-generated submodels from Definition 23 and Lemma 24 to the multi-agent case and turn these singleton models into finitary models. Obviously the class of these finitary, singleton models is recursively enumerable and adapting Lemma 21 to the multi-agent case shows that LP Theorem 26. LP C h (CS) with a decidable schematic CS is decidable.
Conclusion
We have presented a uniform method of proving decidability for justification logics using a refinement of the finite model property. In order to achieve this property, we have adapted the modal techniques of filtration and generated submodels to justification logics. Apart from reproving the known decidability results for J CS , JD CS , JT CS , J4 CS , JD4 CS , and LP CS , this method has enabled us to establish the decidability of the justification logic with common knowledge introduced in [9] .
The main difference from the modal case is the presence of an additional element in models called evidence relation. As evidence relations are in general infinite objects, the filtration has to be performed in such a way that apart from finitizing the set of worlds, also the evidence relation is finitely representable. This finite representation is achieved by using least fixed points of a certain monotone operator that can be read off the axioms of the logic. The existence of the least fixed point is guaranteed when the operator is monotone, which is the case for all the logics considered. Some logics, e.g. justification logics with negative introspection, however, give rise to non-monotone operators. Proving decidability for them requires more involved techniques, see [20] .
